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Workplace Training 
in the United States
Is It Underproduced?
Ann P. B artel 
Columbia University
Economists have long been interested in investigating the determi 
nants and outcomes of investments in job training. Starting with the 
pathbreaking work by Jacob Mincer (1962), researchers have gone on 
to document how job training affects the careers of individuals through 
its impact on wage growth, turnover behavior, and unemployment 
experiences. Studies have also focused on the way in which job train 
ing improves the productivity of business organizations (Bartel, forth 
coming; Holzer et al. 1993) as well as the competitiveness of nations 
(U.S. Congress 1990).
During the last few years, a perception has grown that American 
workers do not receive sufficient on-the-job training. Many have 
argued that government must take a more active role in the market for 
training. Indeed, much of the campaigning in the last presidential elec 
tion focused on this issue. In this paper, I attempt to answer the ques 
tion posed in the title. The plan of attack is as follows. I first review the 
data available from various sources on the amount of training that 
American workers receive and then analyze and compare workplace 
training in other countries to the American experience. The next sec 
tion shows how data on rates of return to investments in job training 
can be used to determine if underinvestment exists, followed by analy 
sis of the likely causes of underinvestment and evaluation of the vari 
ous proposals that have been suggested as cures for the 
underinvestment problem. I then discuss my recent research on the 
relationship between technological change and training and show the 
implications of these research findings for the question posed in the 
title of this paper.
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What Do We Know About Workplace Training 
in the United States?
Our knowledge about the amount of workplace training in the 
United States is only as good as the quality of the available data on 
training. Two types of data sources can be consulted: surveys of indi 
vidual workers and employer surveys. Training questions are included 
in the following surveys of individuals: the Current Population Survey, 
the Panel Study of Income Dynamics and the National Longitudinal 
Surveys of Mature Men, Young Men, Young Women, and Youth. The 
latter survey, the NLSY, is unique in the comprehensiveness of the 
training data reported. Data on a maximum of seven different training 
programs taken at any time since the last interview are included. 
Beginning with the 1988 survey, data on the following items are avail 
able for each of the seven training programs: when the respondent 
began and ended the training programs; what type of program it was, 
e.g., apprenticeships, company training, technical/vocational training 
off the job (such as business college, nurses programs, vocational and 
technical institutes, barber or beauty school, a correspondence course) 
and government training; and how many hours the respondent usually 
devoted per week to this program.' In the other surveys of individuals 
it is not possible to observe when the training actually took place or to 
measure the duration of the training. 2 Hence, the NLSY is the best 
employee-based source for measuring workplace training.
Table 1 provides some descriptive statistics from the NLSY. The 
table shows that in 1990, approximately 13 percent of the individuals 
in the sample received company training each year, and the duration of 
this training was 250 hours. The individuals in this sample are young, 
between the ages of 25 and 32 (in 1990), when most workplace train 
ing takes place. A comparable survey of older individuals would pre 
sumably find a much lower incidence of training. Table 1 also shows 
that education level is an important determinant of receipt of training. 
Only 7.4 percent of individuals with less than a high school education 
received company training, compared to 24.6 percent of college gradu 
ates. Individuals who work in large firms are more likely to receive 
company training compared to those in small firms; 21 percent of indi 
viduals employed by firms with at least 1,000 employees received
Table 1. Incidence and Duration of Company Training by Education and Size of Firm, 1990 










































NOTE: Large firms are defined as firms with at least 1,000 employees
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training compared to 9.5 percent of individuals in smaller firms. The 
picture painted by the data in table 1 is that company training is rela 
tively uncommon; only 13 percent of individuals in the prime training 
years receive it, and it is concentrated among the highly educated 
working in large firms.
The second source of data, employer surveys, also paints a similar 
picture of small amounts of training. Lakewood Publications, the pub 
lishers of Training Magazine, reported that, based on a survey of 2,400 
businesses, the aggregate expenditure on formal training was $45 bil 
lion in calendar year 1989. Averaged across the employed workforce, 
this implies an expenditure of $385 per worker. An alternative bench 
mark is that this expenditure equals 1.8 percent of total compensation 
in the United States. 3
A major disadvantage of employer-based surveys is the low 
response rates on questions relating to the cost of employee training. 
Several years ago, Columbia Business School conducted a survey of 
human resource management practices in American businesses 
(Delaney, Ichniowski, and Lewin 1989). One part of the survey dealt 
with employee training and development, and businesses were asked 
whether they had a formal training program, and, if so, the annual cost 
per employee. Only 40 percent of the businesses that had formal train 
ing programs reported their annual cost. The probability of reporting 
the cost data was unrelated to the size of the business, return-on-assets, 
industry, capital/labor ratio, or the length of time the training program 
had been in operation (Bartel 1991). The problem seems to be that 
many businesses are not sure what costs should be included and/or 
they are unable to readily locate a cost measure for their organization. 
Aggregate cost data on employee training may, therefore, be an unreli 
able measure of the existence of underinvestment.
Workers in the United States receive training from sources other 
than formal company training programs, but the extent of participation 
is low. In the NLSY, 4.2 percent of the individuals reported receiving 
training in 1990 from one of the following sources: a business college, 
a vocational or technical institute, a barber or beauty school, or a corre 
spondence course. Apprenticeships in this sample of individuals were 
relatively rare. In 1990, only 1 percent of the individuals in the NLSY 
reported receiving training through an apprenticeship program. This 
finding is not atypical of other data sources on apprenticeships in the
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United States. For example, the U.S. Congress (1990) reports that, 
between 1970 and 1987, apprentices in federally registered programs 
fell from 0.3 percent of the United States civilian workforce to only 
0.16 percent.
Informal on-the-job training, on the other hand, appears to be quite 
important for American workers. In the January 1991 Current Popula 
tion Survey (U.S. Department of Labor 1992), 38 percent of the indi 
viduals who reported receiving skill improvement training on their 
current job indicated that the source of that training was informal on- 
the-job training. Formal company training was reported as the source 
of skill improvement training for another 38 percent of the individuals. 
The remaining 24 percent reported school or miscellaneous sources. 
Hence, according to this survey, participation in informal on-the-job 
training occurs with the same frequency as participation in formal 
company training programs.
When training is measured by hours rather than by incidence, there 
is some evidence that informal on-the-job training is more important 
than formal company training programs. A 1989 Columbia Business 
School survey of two hundred businesses found that, during their first 
three months on the job, employees in these businesses spent three 
times as many hours in informal training as they did in formal training 
(Bartel 1991). Using data from the 1982 Employment Opportunity 
Pilot Project, Barron, Black, and Loewenstein (1989) also found that, 
during the first three months of employment, time spent in informal 
training exceeded time spent in formal training.
How Does the United States Compare to Other Countries?
One way of judging whether workplace training is adequately pro 
vided in the United States is to compare the experience of a typical 
American worker with that of a worker living in another country. In 
this section, I describe the provision of training in Germany, France, 
and Japan and show how training in these countries differs from the 
United States.
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Germany
At age 16 or the completion of grade 10, German students select a 
"career track." Approximately 60 percent of the students choose to end 
their schooling at this point and enter an apprenticeship program. The 
remaining 40 percent go on to universities or to careers in skilled 
white-collar occupations that require attendance at vocational colleges. 
There are 380 officially recognized occupations for which apprentice 
positions exist (Dowling and Albrecht 1991). Eighty percent of all 
German firms with at least twenty employees participate in apprentice 
ship programs (U.S. Congress 1990).
The apprenticeship contract signed by the company and the appren 
tice states that the company must train the worker in subject areas that 
are determined by the regulations governing a particular occupation. 
The federal government works with trade associations and unions to 
define uniform national curricula and examinations. The contract sets 
out the length of the initial trial period of the apprentice (during which 
either party can opt out of the contract) and his or her wages. The 
apprenticeship period usually lasts between two and three years and is 
split equally between practical training in the firm and vocational edu 
cation at a vocational school run by the government. At the end of the 
apprenticeship period, the student must pass a final exam consisting of 
theoretical and practical parts, which then certifies the student to pur 
sue the occupation. Ninety percent of the apprentices are employed by 
the firm that trained them.
In sum, apprenticeships are a formalized part of the German training 
system. If apprenticeships were to serve as an indicator of the extent of 
job training, we would conclude that the American worker is under- 
trained relative to the German worker. But, as we have already indi 
cated, training is multidimensional, and it is impossible to conclude, 
based on available data, that German workers do indeed receive more 
training overall than American workers.4
France
Unlike the German system of training which relies on apprentice 
ships, the French system has as its central component a mandated 
training tax. Since July 1971, employers with ten or more employees
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have been obligated to spend a certain percentage of their wage bill on 
continuing education and training of employees or pay a tax equal to 
the difference between the obligated and actual training expenditures. 
In 1971, this tax was 0.8 percent of the wage bill; as of January 1993, it 
is 1.4 percent. Unlike the situation in the United States, participation in 
formal company training is quite common in France. In 1990, 32 per 
cent of all French employees received some formal company training 
(Bishop 1993). The incidence of training among young employees is 
likely to be higher than this number. Recall that in the United States, 
only 13 percent of individuals between the ages of 25 and 32 received 
formal company training in 1990. Although participation is much more 
extensive in France, formal training is of much shorter duration. In 
1990, the average time spent in training by a trainee was only 46 
hours! (The comparable figure for the United States is 250 hours.) 
There are some similarities between the American and French experi 
ences. As in the United States, large French firms are more likely to 
provide formal training. In 1990, 53 percent of the employees in firms 
with at least 2,000 workers received training, compared to 8 percent of 
the employees in firms with 10-19 employees (Bishop 1993). There is 
also a positive relationship between skill level (education) and receipt 
of training. Whereas 50 percent of managers and professionals in 
French firms received formal company training in 1990, only 13 per 
cent of unskilled operatives received it.
Hence, these data do not support the conclusion that French workers 
receive more training than American workers. While incidence of 
training is higher in France, duration is considerably smaller.
Japan
The Japanese approach to training differs substantially from the 
German approach. In Japan, training is for a firm, not a trade. Large 
firms provide extensive workplace training, and there is minimal gov 
ernment involvement or assistance. The policy of providing continuous 
training for employees is largely grounded in the Japanese system of 
"lifetime employment" in large firms. A case study of American and 
Japanese autoworkers showed that autoworkers in Japanese plants 
receive three times as much training each year as workers in U.S. 
plants (U.S. Congress 1990).
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While large firms in Japan provide extensive on-the-job training to 
their employees, only one-third of the Japanese labor force is 
employed by such firms. The remaining two-thirds work in small firms 
where lifetime employment is not guaranteed and training is not exten 
sive.
Rates of Return as Measures of Underinvestment 
in Training
As demonstrated above, a comparison of the U.S. training system 
with the systems used in other countries does not lead to an unambigu 
ous conclusion that American workers are undertrained relative to their 
foreign counterparts. Here I approach the underinvestment question in 
a different way. In particular, I present data on the rates of return to job 
training for different groups of workers and consider whether the 
observed rates are too high. A rate of return above the rates on invest 
ments of comparable risk levels would enable us to conclude that 
underinvestment in job training does exist.
The rate of return that an employer earns on investment in employee 
training can be calculated by utilizing data on the costs of the training 
program and the returns that the employer receives. In order to calcu 
late this accurately, the researcher would require information on the 
direct costs of the training program (i.e., instructors' salaries, materi 
als, books, etc.), the time spent by trainees in the programs and the 
value of their lost productivity during the training period, and the 
increase in productivity that occurs after the training is completed and 
that can be attributed to participation in the training program. This is a 
very stringent list of requirements and can only be fulfilled if the 
researcher has access to a company that keeps good records and is will 
ing to share the information.
I was fortunate to gain access to the personnel files and training 
database of a large manufacturing company. The direct costs of train 
ing were calculated from the company's records on the salaries of 
trainers, materials, and other expenses such as room and board for resi 
dential training programs. Indirect costs were calculated by multiply 
ing the number of days spent in training by the daily salary earned by
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the employee prior to participation in the training program. The returns 
that the company earned from the training program were calculated 
from a fixed effects model which estimated the effect of time spent in 
the training program on salary (Bartel 1992). 5 If workers are assumed 
to stay "forever" in this company, the rate of return equals the ratio of 
the annual return to training divided by the sum of the direct and indi 
rect costs of training. Table 2 shows that the calculated rate of return on 
training for this company is 21 percent. Of course, it is unrealistic to 
assume that workers stay forever at a company, and the rate of return 
needs to be adjusted to reflect the expected tenure at the company. 6 In 
this company, expected tenure is about ten years, and the adjusted rate 
of return equals 17 percent.
Table 2. Rates of Return on Investments in Job Training















a In this column, the rate of return is calculated by assuming that the payoff period for the 
investment equals the observed average length of tenure in the particular sample, 
b. Mincer (1991). 
c. Bartel (1992).
Admittedly these rates of return only pertain to one company and 
may not be generalizable to other companies in the United States. A 
more general estimate of the rate of return to job training in the United 
States can be calculated from national datasets on individuals. Unfortu 
nately, with these datasets the cost of training may not be precisely 
measured. Information on direct costs of training are, of necessity, 
unavailable in datasets on individuals. The indirect costs of training 
can be inferred from data on the average amount of time spent in train 
ing by individuals who reported receiving training during the last year. 
Table 2 shows that in the NLS Y sample, the calculated rate of return is
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32 percent if the individuals are assumed to stay with their employers 
"forever," but that the rate of return falls to 16 percent when it is 
adjusted for expected tenure. Since the individuals in this sample are 
young, their expected tenure is only three years; this produces a large 
drop in the adjusted rate of return. Mincer (1991) calculated the rates 
of return on training for the individuals in the Panel Study of Income 
Dynamics, and I report those rates as well in table 2. The unadjusted 
rate is 29 percent and the adjusted rate is 25 percent.
The adjusted rates in table 2 range from 16 percent to 25 percent. 
These rates seem high when compared to other investments. For exam 
ple, Bound and Johnson (1992) calculate that the private rate of return 
on a year of schooling is currently about 8.5 percent in the United 
States.7 Using this number as a benchmark would lead to a conclusion 
that there is underinvestment in job training. It is possible, however, 
that the estimated rates of return on training may be overestimates of 
the true rates. This could occur if the true cost of training is underesti 
mated or the returns on training are overestimated because of incom 
plete controls for unobserved heterogeneity or overly optimistic 
estimates of a worker's expected tenure.
What Can Account for Underinvestment in Training?
If we use the rates of return reported in the previous section as evi 
dence that workplace training in the United States is underproduced, 
we next need to consider why this underinvestment takes place. Armed 
with this analysis, we can then proceed to make informed policy rec 
ommendations to increase investment in training.
It has been argued (Bishop 1991) that American workers receive 
less training than their German and Japanese counterparts because the 
turnover rate is higher in the United States. The OECD (1984) reports 
that, for employees with less than one year of tenure, the probability of 
staying at the firm for at least twelve additional months is over 80 per 
cent in the United Kingdom, 76 percent in Japan but only 41 percent in 
the United States. In Germany, 95 percent of apprentices who complete 
the three-month probationary period stay with their employer for the 
full three-year apprenticeship period (Bishop 1991). The typical pat-
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tern of a young American worker is to engage in job shopping during 
the early years in the labor market. High rates of turnover will reduce 
the firm's incentive to invest in specific training. Bishop (1991) shows 
that employers also pay part of the costs of general training, and the 
expectation of high turnover will therefore also reduce the firm's 
incentive to provide general training.
Another factor contributing to less training in the United States is 
the difficulty that American employers have in assessing the quality of 
an applicant's general skills. In Germany, standardized curricula and 
national certification standards provide employers with reliable infor 
mation on a job applicant's skills. In the United States, employers do 
not give enough weight to an applicant's stock of general skills. The 
result is that American workers have less incentive to invest in general 
skills.
The constraint imposed by the minimum wage reduces the incentive 
for firms to invest in training workers whose value of marginal product 
is less than the legislated minimum wage. This happens because the 
workers are unable to offer to pay for general training by accepting a 
wage below the minimum wage. Leighton and Mincer (1981) provide 
evidence that the minimum wage leads to less on-the-job training for 
low-skilled young workers than would otherwise occur. While it is true 
that employers are now able to pay a subminimum training wage to 
employees under the age of 20 for the first six months of their employ 
ment, this does not address the problem faced by unskilled workers 
aged 20 and over. 8
A fourth reason for underinvestment is that young workers are 
unable to pay for the general skills that they need because they are 
liquidity-constrained. Since firms have no incentive to pay for general 
training (except, perhaps, because of the positive effect on their reputa 
tions), young workers must subsidize their own training and often have 
insufficient funds to do so.
Finally, it has been argued (U.S. Congress 1990) that American 
workers may receive less training than German and Japanese workers 
because they have poor basic skills. According to the Office of Tech 
nology Assessment, American companies find that, in their operations 
in Germany or Japan, workers have better reading and math skills than 
Americans in the United States. The absence of good basic skills
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makes the American worker less trainable, thereby reducing the per 
ceived return on the company's investment in training.
Policy Options to Increase Investment in Training
In this section I review and evaluate a number of policy recommen 
dations that have been suggested to increase employee and employer 
investments in on-the-job training. The first idea is that training should 
be provided by the government. The obvious criticism of this proposal 
is that the government will not have adequate information to know 
what types of skills businesses need in their employees.
A second approach is to adopt the French system whereby a payroll- 
based national training tax is imposed on all employers. Under this 
system, employers would either spend the mandated percentage 
amount on training or pay a tax equal to the difference between the 
obligated and actual training expenditures. While this approach is pref 
erable to direct provision of training by the government because it 
allows the firm to decide on the amount and type of training, it suffers 
from a number of problems. First, there is no incentive for firms to 
spend beyond the mandated level. Second, it favors large firms because 
of economies of scale in the provision of formal training. Third, it 
completely ignores informal training, and we have already seen that 
informal training is a significant component of total training. Firms 
that find it optimal to rely on informal training would be penalized 
under this system. Fourth, there would be significant measurement 
problems as firms and the government debate what types of activities 
qualify as training.
A third approach is for the federal government to provide subsidies 
to firms that engage in training. This is more appealing than the man 
date approach because it does not require firms to spend a stipulated 
amount; firms would enjoy more flexibility in making the optimal 
choice. The federal government's Job Training Partnership Act created 
a system to share the costs of training new employees with private 
firms. Unfortunately, recent reports (Business Week 1992) have docu 
mented misuse of JTPA funds. In particular, firms have been accused 
of using JTPA funds to cover the costs of "training" workers who were
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already trained, as well as unreasonably extending the length of a 
worker's training period.
A number of states have training subsidy programs, and the evi 
dence regarding the impact of these programs is, unlike the JTPA, gen 
erally positive. Creticos and Sheets (1990) studied the programs that 
exist in New York, Illinois, California, and Missouri and found that in 
twenty-four companies that received financial aid from the states, all of 
the companies showed improvements in business performance from 
the training. Holzer et al. (1993) have studied the training grant pro 
gram operated in Michigan during 1988 and 1989, called the Michigan 
Job Opportunity Bank-Upgrade Program. They found that firms that 
received training grants significantly increased the amount of training 
they provided their employees; in other words, the subsidies did not 
simply provide windfalls to those firms already engaging in training. 
But the experiences with JTPA indicate that a government subsidy pro 
gram will require careful monitoring to avoid abuse.
Another idea that has been suggested is that the government should 
subsidize the creation of employer training collectives (U.S. Congress 
1990). The purpose of these collectives would be for firms in an indus 
try to jointly provide the skills necessary for that industry. By sharing 
the costs and risks of providing training, firms would have an incentive 
to train more. The disadvantage of this approach is that firms in an 
industry may be concerned about sharing proprietary information. 
Also, free-riders outside the consortia could attempt to raid the newly 
trained workers.
Finally, there are some government programs that can be introduced 
to increase the incentive for the employee to invest in general training. 
Like the German government, the U.S. government can work with 
industry and trade groups to establish national certification standards 
for various trades and occupations. This will enable employers to 
assess the quality of the general skills an applicant possesses. In addi 
tion, the federal government could consider providing low-cost loans 
to individuals who wish to acquire general skills. Alternatively, a revi 
sion of the current tax law that pertains to the deductibility of an 
employee's own training expenses could be considered. At the present 
time, if an employee pays for his or her own training, the expenses can 
only be deducted if the sum of those expenses plus all other miscella-
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neous deductions exceeds 2 percent of an individual's adjusted gross 
income.
The Role of Technological Change
The programs discussed in the previous section are attempts to 
address perceived flaws in the U.S. market for training. Each of the 
suggested programs strives to increase training by either circumvent 
ing the market entirely, subsidizing the costs incurred by trainees or 
trainers, or improving the quality of information in the labor market.
It is possible, however, that the future for the U.S. training market is 
brighter than we currently think. The ratio of expenditures on com 
pany-sponsored R&D to net sales has been increasing in the United 
States in recent years (National Science Foundation 1989). Rates of 
productivity growth in the 1980s are far ahead of the rates observed in 
the late 1970s (U.S. Department of Labor 1992). All of this bodes well 
for the training of American workers because, in a world in which 
firms are updating or changing their production technologies, the 
opportunities for learning expand. When firms are introducing new 
technologies, they have an incentive to train their employees in order 
to reap the productivity gains from the technological change. A formal 
way of stating this argument is that the marginal cost of producing a 
unit of human capital investment decreases with technological change 
(Tan 1989).
Some people may take a more pessimistic view of the relationship 
between technological change and training. The basis for the pessimis 
tic view is that technological change increases the rate at which human 
capital depreciates. Within the Ben-Porath (1967) framework, higher 
rates of depreciation reduce the marginal return to investment and 
thereby lead to less investment in on-the-job training in each time 
period. The theoretical prediction about the impact of technological 
change on the amount of on-the-job training is ambiguous.
In my paper with Nachum Sicherman (Bartel and Sicherman 1993), 
I conducted an empirical analysis that resolves the theoretical ambigu 
ity. We used the 1979-1990 National Longitudinal Surveys of Labor 
Market Experience of Youth aged 14-21 in 1979 to analyze whether
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individuals who work in industries that are technologically progressive 
receive more training, ceteris paribus. Since our study covers both the 
manufacturing and nonmanufacturing sectors, we measure an indus 
try's rate of technological change by its rate of productivity change as 
calculated by Jorgenson, Gollop, and Fraumeni (1987). Ideally, one 
would prefer to use R&D intensity as the measure of technological 
change in the industry, but R&D data are only available for the manu 
facturing sector. Griliches and Lichtenberg (1984) have shown that for 
the time period 1959-1976 there was a significant relationship between 
an industry's intensity of private R&D expenditures and subsequent 
growth in productivity. Lichtenberg and Siegel (1991) also found that 
this relationship existed at the company level in the 1970s and 1980s.
In our study, we estimated an equation in which the dependent vari 
able is the probability of receiving company training since the last sur 
vey (i.e., during the last year) and the independent variables are (1) the 
mean rate of technological change in the individual's industry during 
the ten years prior to the date of the interview, and (2) a vector of con 
trol variables that includes education, experience and its square, tenure 
and its square, size of plant in which the individual works, marital sta 
tus, race, union membership, and residence in an SMSA. We found 
that, in industries with higher rates of technological change, employees 
are significantly more likely to receive company training.
If rates of technological change continue to increase over the next 
decade as they have during the last five years, these findings would 
predict an increase in the amount of training that U.S. workers will 
receive. This will not require tampering with the U.S. training market 
by imposing targets for training, nor will it require an expenditure of 
government funds to subsidize the cost of training. Rather, an increase 
in employee training will be a simple by-product of increased rates of 
technological change and expenditures on R&D.
Summary and Conclusions
I began this paper by posing the question of whether or not work 
place training in the United States is underproduced. In order to answer 
this question, it was necessary to carefully review the data available on
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the extent of workplace training in the United States. Since company 
data are generally sparse, researchers must rely on surveys of individu 
als that include questions on workplace training. These data show that 
only 13 percent of individuals in the prime training years (ages 25-32) 
received formal company training in the United States in 1990, and 
that this training was concentrated among the highly educated working 
in large firms. Apprenticeships are rare in the United States. Informal 
on-the-job training appears to be at least as important as formal com 
pany training.
The training experience of the American worker is very different 
from that of workers in other countries. But, specific comparisons with 
Germany, France, and Japan do not enable us to unambiguously con 
clude that American workers, in general, receive less training than their 
counterparts in those countries. An alternative approach to the underin 
vestment question is to consider whether the observed rates of return 
on investments in job training are too high. We found that rates are 
indeed high when compared to rates of return to education in the 
United States. Underinvestment in job training could be due to high 
turnover, the absence of standardized curricula and national certifica 
tion standards for occupations, minimum wage constraints, liquidity 
constraints, and/or weak basic skills of American workers. Each of 
these causes suggests a proposed solution, and we reviewed and cri 
tiqued a number of these: (1) direct provision of training by the gov 
ernment, (2) a payroll-based national training tax similar to the system 
used in France, (3) government subsidies to firms that train their work 
ers, (4) employer training collectives, and (5) low-cost loans and tax 
breaks for individuals who pay for their own training.
While the high rates of return to training may be consistent with a 
yes answer to the question posed in the title, I ended with an optimistic 
forecast for the future of the training market. Research evidence has 
shown that technological change increases the incentives for invest 
ment in training. If the recent upward trends in R&D expenditures and 
productivity growth rates in the U.S. continue, we can predict that 
opportunities for training will increase. The attractiveness of this sce 
nario is that the increase in training will not require government inter 
ference with the training market.
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NOTES
1. Prior to 1988, detailed information on type of private sector training, as well as the weeks 
and hours per week spent in training, were only recorded if the training spell lasted at least four 
weeks
2. In the National Longitudinal Surveys of Young and Older Men and Young Women, the sur 
vey asks, "What was the longest type of training you have had since the last interview 7" In the 
Current Population Survey, the question is, "What training was needed to get the current or last 
job and what training is needed to improve skills on the current job?"
3 In France, expenditures on formal company training equal 3 percent of total compensation.
4. In the report prepared by the U S Congress (1990), evidence is presented that workers in 
German metalworking firms receive more training than comparable workers in British metal- 
working firms. No evidence is presented, however, that beyond the apprenticeship period, Ger 
man workers receive more training than Amencan workers
5 The profitability of training is actually the increase in productivity less the increase in 
wages. Barren, Black, and Loewenstem (1989) and Blakemore and Hoffman (1988) show that 
productivity doubles compared to wages in the datasets that they analyze. This implies that the 
wage increase attributable to training is a good proxy for the productivity increase produced by 
training
6 Mincer (1991) shows that adjusted rate of return is calculated by the following formula 
r = r'(l - (1/1+r)7 ) where T= expected tenure and r is the adjusted rate of return
7 This does not include the consumption returns to schooling If these were added in, the rate 
of return on schooling would increase, and may approach the rate of return on training
8. In an analysis of the fast food industry, Katz and Krueger (1992) provide evidence that the 
submimmum training wage is rarely used
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